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Originally, I planned to begin with the following quote by Socrates: “I
know nothing except the fact of my ignorance.” Although Socrates did not
speak about interchange fees, his phrase somehow reflects the fact that we—
at least as far as the European Central Bank (ECB) is concerned—are still
at the very beginning of a process of understanding the precise effects of
interchange fees. However, now, in the midst of the very interesting discus-
sions that we have had at this conference, I feel much more inclined to make
reference to another element of Socrates’ work, namely his conviction that
dialogue is the instrument through which to overcome ignorance. Dialogue
furthers knowledge and brings about explanation. I can assure you that, just
as Socrates predicts, my colleagues and I will return to the ECB with many
useful insights and new ideas for our work on interchange fees.
The ECB approaches interchange fees from the perspective of our main
priority currently: payment integration in the euro area. You may ask your-
self why, six years after the introduction of the single currency, an integrated
payment area has not yet been achieved. Much of my presentation will focus
on this question and will explore the ways in which further integration can
be achieved. Integration is a priority for the ECB because we regard it as an
important means of creating a more competitive market in payment instru-
ments. Were the fragmented markets currently in evidence in the euro area
to remain in place, this, in our view, would fuel resistance further to integra-
tion and thus would help vested interests to preserve the status quo.
My presentation will look first at interchange fees in the euro area and
discuss the role and focus of the ECB. I will then give an overview of the
fragmented payments landscape in the euro area and, before concluding, I
will concentrate on some legal and competition policy aspects.
The interchange fee can be an important tool to increase the acceptance
of a card scheme by bringing on board both sides of the market—the mer-
chants and the customers—and by making this profitable for both the 
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 issuing and acquiring banks. It can also be used strategically to extend the
market, for example, in overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem com-
monly encountered in the inception of payment networks. These benefits
of interchange fees are sometimes overshadowed by the fact that such fees
also may be used to extract rents from one side of the market—in the case
of card schemes, usually the merchants. Under which economic circum-
stances and framework of rules this is likely to occur is not yet fully clear. 
Interchange fees are currently emerging as a topic of debate in the euro
area, as there have been a number of merchants’ complaints claiming that
some card schemes levy excessive charges. Moreover, several national com-
petition authorities and the European Commission (EC) have recently
stepped in to address the issues surrounding the pricing of card schemes.
In the euro area, international card schemes set a default fee, namely a
fee which is used by issuers and acquirers in the event that no bilateral or
multilateral agreement is in place. It can be applied to both national and
intra-European transactions. In regard to national card schemes, which are
mainly debit card schemes, there is currently quite some fragmentation
across euro area countries on the question of interchange fee practices and
levels. In some member states, interchange fees have long been an estab-
lished part of the card business and have been accepted by stakeholders.
They may be set by the scheme or bilaterally between the members. They
may be ad valorem or fixed. In other countries, they do not exist at all. In
some cases, the introduction of interchange fees and, subsequently, of mer-
chant fees has given rise to strong merchant resistance and has led nation-
al authorities to intervene and set fee levels.
The differences in interchange fee practices and levels between national
and cross-border payments within the euro area are an impediment to euro
area integration. They result in different charges being applied for nation-
al and cross-border payments and thus in payments being treated different-
ly. For example, merchants often complain that the high interchange fee
and the resulting merchant fee for international cards, which, for the
moment, are the only cards that can be used for transactions between euro
area countries, prevents them from accepting these cards. Euro area citizens
thus may find themselves in the uncomfortable situation of not being able
to use their cards.
There are two forces that come into play in order to ensure the equal
treatment of national and cross-border transactions. On the one hand,
public regulators can ensure a harmonized level. On the other hand, the
card industry itself can make a substantial contribution to the objective of
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 payment integration. Enhanced transparency and pan-European standards
will lead to an increase in competition, which, in turn, can be expected to
influence costs and fee practices, including interchange fee practices, and
to promote euro area integration. The integration work of the banking
industry, supported by the ECB, will gradually do away with the
national/cross-border distinction.
Interchange fees and their impact on efficiency so far have not been a key
issue for the ECB because the main focus of the ECB’s role in the field of
payments since the introduction of the single currency has been the estab-
lishment of structures and standards to ensure the safety of payments in
Europe. The Eurosystem, which comprises the ECB and the 12 national
central banks of the euro area countries, acts as an operator, having estab-
lished TARGET (trans-European automated real-time gross settlement
express transfer), an RTGS (real-time gross settlement) payments system
allowing for the settling of large-value euro payments in a very safe man-
ner. As overseer, the Eurosystem has adopted standards that the various
payments systems need to meet, most importantly, the “Core Principles for
Systemically Important Payment Systems,” the standards for payments sys-
tems. A subset of those principles also serves as a basis for retail payments
systems in the euro area that are of systemic or prominent importance.
With structures and standards for ensuring safety in place, the ECB has
started to shift its focus toward efficiency. Together with the national cen-
tral banks, the ECB acts in this area mainly as a catalyst. It encourages
change, plays the role of facilitator, and helps to remove obstacles. The
catalyst role is currently directed toward encouraging the establishment of
a single euro payments area, or SEPA. The establishment of the SEPA is a
project led by the European banking industry and strongly supported by
the Eurosystem. It covers all payment instruments and their supporting
infrastructures, but the initial focus will be on cards, credit transfers, and
direct debits. While the national payment instruments and infrastructures
within the euro area are for the most part very efficient, they have a very
strong national identity and, as they stand, cannot cater for pan-European
needs. The goal of the SEPA is to create within the euro area a truly
European payments area equalling the efficiency of the best national pay-
ment instruments and infrastructures. The Eurosystem is engaged in a
fruitful dialogue not only with the European banking industry, but also
with all other stakeholders in the payments system, be they customers,
merchants, corporate users, or the national or community legislators.
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In my view, there are enormous efficiency gains to be made in the areas
of payment processing and payments system infrastructures in the euro area.
Current infrastructures were built for the legacy currencies, meaning those
replaced by the euro. But nowadays, six years after the introduction of the
single currency, payments systems can no longer satisfy only national needs.
There is a clear euro area dimension to any payments system, and relevant
adjustments clearly are needed. The key concern is whether the industry is
able to generate the standards that are necessary to ensure 
compatibility between systems. Only when compatibility and transparency
are ensured will there be a positive effect on volumes and competition, 
generating the increased efficiency that we would expect in an integrated,
single market in Europe.
I would now like to explain why there is this need for greater 
efficiency and further integration in payments—in particular in card 
payments—by presenting some data on trends and developments.
Customers and businesses in the euro area are, as in other parts of the
world, increasingly using “electronic payments,” as illustrated in Chart 1.
Paper-based payment instruments—checks, for instance—are losing 
Chart 1:
Trends in Payment Instrument Use
Number of transactions:
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market share. In the past, card payments have not been as popular in the
euro area as other payment instruments, such as credit transfers (or “wire
transfers,” as they are known in the United States) and direct debits.
Cards—both debit and credit—however, have proven to be very suc-
cessful in recent years in the euro area. Statistics show that in the last five
years the use of cards has almost doubled. Cards are currently one of the
three most popular cashless payment instruments, with credit transfers,
card payments, and direct debit currently enjoying very similar market
shares in the euro area. The U.S. payments system, as can be seen on the
right-hand side of Chart 1, relies mainly on cards and checks alone.
As shown in Chart 2, the growth in the market for cards can, to a large
extent, be attributed to debit cards. These currently account for more than
two-thirds of all card payments.
1 The euro area hosts more than 20 three-
and four-party card schemes, the majority of which are national debit card
schemes available only for payments in their national markets.
Currently, card payments in countries other than that where the card
was issued are generally possible only via the international card schemes,
Visa and MasterCard. Discussions are currently taking place regarding the

















































Sources: BIS Red Book and ECB Blue BookMap 1 shows that Europe is still, to a large extent, composed of national
markets with different payment habits and industry structures. Averages do
not tell the whole truth. The use of cards—as with other payment instru-
ments—varies substantially among the euro area countries. In the euro area,
there are a few countries with relatively high levels of card use—France, the
Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg—and a few with moderate use—
Ireland, Portugal, and Belgium. In the remaining five euro area countries,
however, cards are not as popular as other payment instruments, with pay-
ments made instead using cash, credit transfers, or direct debits. In none of
the euro area countries is the level of card use as high as in North America.
Euro area citizens make an average of 36 card payments per year. In the
United States, the figure is almost four times higher, at 126 transactions.
I should, however, point out, by way of a caveat, that the data are cer-
tainly not fully comparable between the United States and the euro area.
Indeed, even within the euro area we are currently working on the
enhancement of the quality of these data. In any event, the observation can
be made that, while in many euro area countries card use currently repre-
sents only a small fraction of card use in the United States, the position of
cards is strengthening everywhere.








Per inhabitant, figures 
for 2003 (Blue Book)
36 transactions per inhabitant
in the euro areaDifferences in payment habits are not confined to cards. We also see sig-
nificant differentials in the use of all other payment instruments, illustrat-
ed in Map 2. Credit transfers are more popular in the Netherlands, Austria,
and Finland than elsewhere in the euro area. Direct debits are, on average,
twice as popular in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands as in other euro
area countries. Checks are in excess of 10 times more popular in France
than elsewhere, and e-money has been most successful in replacing other
means of payment in the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg). Moreover, for most instruments, such differentials are
increasing over time.
As card payments are picking up, they are becoming an increasingly 
relevant issue for regulatory and competition authorities.
Efficiency-oriented regulation in the field of payments so far has been
carried out principally by legislatures and competition authorities, both at
the national and at the European level. As the card industry is still largely
fragmented, most of those regulatory and competition activities are pur-
sued at the national level. At the European level, the European









Card-based e-moneyIn the European Union, interchange fees have been investigated or are
currently under investigation by the EC and several national entities, that
is to say, the British, French, Dutch, and Danish authorities.
The regulation of interchange fees is no trivial matter. Take, for example,
the bundling of costs in the interchange fee. By “bundling of costs,” I mean
the practice of providing a package of services, for example, a free funding
period or a payment guarantee together with a fee for the transaction itself.
Bundling normally means that the fee is provided as a package which can-
not be split without bilateral agreements.
Various aspects of this issue have been presented by the EC (which was
looking at Visa) and by the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (which was look-
ing at MasterCard). However, those investigating authorities arrived at dif-
ferent conclusions. The EC regarded the bundled interchange fees as pro-
viding a fair level of services to both merchants and cardholders, thereby
contributing to technical and economic progress. The fees were therefore
considered to fulfil the conditions for an exemption under the competition
rules of the EC Treaty. The Office of Fair Trading, on the other hand, con-
sidered that the bundled interchange fee would not qualify for an exemp-
tion under the U.K. Competition Act. Their argument was that any addi-
tional services should be a matter of choice for the cardholder and the mer-
chant; otherwise, unnecessary burdens would be placed on consumers.
However, we should keep in mind that the Visa decision relates to an
EU-wide cross-border interchange fee for consumer cards, while the Office
of Fair Trading’s preliminary conclusion regarding MasterCard is restricted
to transactions made in the United Kingdom.
Some governments and central banks (for example, the Danish govern-
ment and the Reserve Bank of Australia) have been taking action to restrict
the level of interchange fees and limit the conditions of the agreements
between the parties involved. This is a straightforward, but often contro-
versial, way of taking action, as the regulatory authority is thereby placing
restrictions on the market. The advantage of such measures is mainly on
the consumer side, even though it could be argued that a restriction on
such costs, in the long run, could force service providers to cut their pro-
cessing costs. However, factual costs incurred by the participating entities
have to be covered, if not directly, then indirectly from other services. The
ECB is following developments in these countries with great interest.
There are also a couple of other European competition cases regarding
cards that should be mentioned. The EC challenged nine major French
banking groups and Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) in July 2004
286 Interchange in a Changing Market: Observations from the Euro Area Perspective
 for sharing out the market for the issuance of CB cards in France in order
to restrict competition from new entrants. Furthermore, the national com-
petition authority of the Netherlands decided in April 2004 that Interpay
had abused its dominant position by charging excessive rates for the provi-
sion of network services for debit card transactions.
As you can see from these examples, European competition authorities
have recently stepped up their activities in the field of interchange fees,
aiming to combat abuse of dominant positions in the card market, both at
the national and at the community level. However, when considering such
issues, it is important that the relevant national authorities are aware of the
euro area integration for cards, allowing them to help promote and facili-
tate the establishment of pan-European card services. In so doing, they will
help to enhance competition not only in the national markets, but also in
the euro area market.
An integrated card market in Europe is the principal concern of the
ECB, and the enhancement of competition is a key means of achieving this
goal. The ECB considers interchange fees to be the result of business agree-
ments between market participants in a free and open market, and the
ECB relies on competent authorities to ensure that such fees are not set at
a level which is harmful to society. At the same time, by encouraging the
industry to adopt procedures and standards that ensure compatibility and
transparency, the ECB seeks to facilitate further integration. And integra-
tion, in my view, is the key means of increasing competition; facilitating
consolidation; and, as a result, enhancing the efficiency of the European
card industry to the benefit of business, consumers, and public authorities.
But integration must come first. 
Finally, I would like to emphasize our role and objective.
The ECB operates in a specific environment different from the ones in
which central banks usually operate. In Europe, the introduction of the sin-
gle currency established new conditions and requirements. The ECB pur-
sues the objective of integration across the euro area, and the integration of
payments services is part of this wider objective. Indeed, establishing the
SEPA is one of our main priorities in the field of payments. From this stems
our interest in interchange fees, which are part of the legal, technical, and
commercial conditions necessary in order to promote integration.
We are aware of the problems and issues at stake in relation to interchange
fees. For the moment, we see our role as a facilitator for the banking indus-
try: We are contributing to the SEPA card scheme framework, which the
industry is developing, and we are trying to steer the market toward 
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initiatives closely and stand ready to intervene if progress is lacking.
The SEPA is a key project in order to reap the full benefits of the single
currency. More competition in the financial sector is needed to foster
growth in the euro area. But in order to establish a truly integrated pay-
ments area, banks need to progress swiftly. In the six years since the intro-
duction of the euro, there has been enough time to prepare for the next
step. The banking industry, with the help of central banks, should use the
current window of opportunity and chart a course toward integration.
ENDNOTE
1 The number of transactions carried out using debit cards has grown over the
past five years at a rate of 17 percent, with the use of credit cards increasing at a rate
of 15 percent. Overall, the use of non-cash payment instruments has grown at an
annual rate of 3.4 percent.
288 Interchange in a Changing Market: Observations from the Euro Area Perspective
 